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PREVIEW; McCoy v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc.: How Far
Does Sovereign Immunity Extend?
Remy J. Orrantia*
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals will hear oral argument
on this matter Friday, October 25 at 9:00 a.m. in the Second Floor
Courtroom of The Pioneer Courthouse in Portland, Oregon.
Torrance L. Coburn will appear on behalf of the Appellant, Martin
S. King will appear on behalf of the Appellee, and John Harrison
will appear on behalf of the Intervenor-Appellee.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This case presents the issue of whether a tribal college,
incorporated under the laws of the Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes (“Tribe”) and, subsequently, the State of Montana,
may be considered an arm of the Tribe, thus benefitting from tribal
sovereign immunity. The resolution of this issue will influence tribal
jurisdictional questions throughout the state and the country. The
Appellant, Stephen McCoy, asserts that the federal courts have
federal question jurisdiction over his Title VII claims against
Appellee, Salish Kootenai College, Inc. (“College”) because it is not
an arm of the Tribe and therefore is not immune from Title VII
claims.1
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The College was originally chartered and incorporated under
Confederated Salish and Kootenai tribal law in 1977, and shortly
thereafter, in 1978, it was incorporated under Montana law.2
Stephen McCoy began his 23-year employment with the College in
1992 and served in several capacities over that period.3 McCoy
claims that he was subjected to a hostile work environment which
*

Remy J. Orrantia, J.D./M.B.A. Candidate 2021, Alexander Blewett III School
of Law at the University of Montana.
1
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 5–6, McCoy v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc.,
(9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2019) (No. 18-35729).
2
Appellee’s Answering Brief at 9–11, McCoy v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc.,
(9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2019) (No. 18-35729).
3
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 3.
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culminated with his resignation in December 2016.4 Beginning in
November 2014, McCoy claims he was subjected to multiple
allegations and insinuations that he made improper romantic
advances towards personnel of entities the College conducts
business with; he was removed from two coordinator positions he
held; and he was improperly disciplined.5
After resigning, McCoy filed his complaint with the
Montana Human Rights Bureau and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and subsequently received notice of his
right to file an action in district court.6 The subsequent complaint
filed in the United States District Court for the District of Montana,
Missoula Division, alleges sex-based discrimination under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act and the Montana Human Rights Act.7
The College moved for jurisdictional discovery to determine
if the federal court had proper subject matter jurisdiction over the
case and subsequently moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted.8 After extensive briefing, the district court granted the
College’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the College was an
arm of the Tribe and shared its sovereign immunity under the fivefactor test established in White v. University of California.9 McCoy
has appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and
the Tribe have stepped in as an intervening party.
III.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

Indian tribal sovereignty has a long and storied history in the
United States.10 The courts have long viewed Indian tribes as
4

Id.
Complaint at 3, McCoy v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc., (D. Mont. June 26,
2017) (CV 17-88-M-DLC).
6
Id. at 4.
7
Id. at 4–5.
8
Salish Kootenai College’s Motion to Dismiss at 1, McCoy v. Salish Kootenai
College, Inc., (D. Mont. Feb. 2, 2018) (CV 17-88-M-DLC).
9
765 F.3d 1010, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014).
10
Dating to the original treaties entered into by the British Monarchy and the
colonial Indian tribes they interacted with. See, e.g. Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. 515, 544 (1832) (holding that the United States had succeeded all political
5
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“domestic dependent nations that exercise inherent authority over
their members and territories,”11 and that sovereign authority and
immunity extend beyond merely governmental activities, covering
business activities of a tribe as well.12 Modern jurisprudence has
evolved to establish a test as to whether an entity may share in a
tribe’s sovereign immunity because it is conducting business as an
arm of the tribe.13
The White test, adopted from the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, presents five factors to be weighed in determining whether
the entity is sufficiently intertwined with the tribe so as to share its
sovereign immunity.14 The factors to be weighed are: (1) the method
of creation of the entity; (2) the entity’s purpose; (3) the entity’s
structure, ownership, and management, including the amount of
control the tribe has over the entity; (4) the tribe’s intent to share its
sovereign immunity with the entity; and (5) the financial
relationship between the tribe and the entity.15 The totality of
McCoy’s claims depend on whether he can show that the College
fails to meet the White factors, overcoming the district court’s
finding that the College is acting as an arm of the Tribe and that its
activities can be properly viewed as those of the Tribe.16 On appeal,
the Court will review the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction de novo.17

and territorial claims of Great Britain, including treaties with Native American
tribes recognizing them as sovereign entities).
11
Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S.
505, 509 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12
Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations
omitted).
13
White v. University of Cal., 765 F.3d 1010, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014) (establishing
the five-factor “arm of the tribe” test).
14
Breakthrough Mgmt. Group, Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort, 629
F.3d 1173, 1187 (10th Cir. 2010).
15
White, 765 F.3d at 1025.
16
Allen, 464 F.3d at 1046.
17
Atwood v. Fort Peck Tribal Court Assiniboine, 513 F.3d 943, 946 (9th Cir.
2008).
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Appellant’s Argument

McCoy argues that none of the White factors weigh in favor
of the College being an arm of the Tribe. 18 McCoy argues under the
first White factor, that the law under which the entity is formed is a
strong determinative factor in establishing whether an entity should
be treated as an arm of an Indian tribe, and an entity being formed
under the laws of a state weighs against that factor. 19 McCoy hones
in on the fact that the College’s Articles of Incorporation themselves
state that the incorporators acted both as citizens of the United States
and of the state of Montana.20 McCoy also distinguishes the
incorporation under state law from the College’s incorporation
under Confederated Salish and Kootenai tribal law. He claims that
the College—as incorporated under Montana law—is a separate and
distinct entity from the College as incorporated under tribal law.21
He supports this by noting that the College’s Montana Articles of
Incorporation do not mention tribal law or reserve any rights to the
Tribe, while the tribal Articles of Incorporation state that the entity
may only be sued in tribal court.22 McCoy argues that these
distinctions strongly weigh against finding that the College is an arm
of the Tribe.
McCoy argues that the purpose of the College is not for the
benefit of the Tribe. He states that the College’s Articles of
Incorporation state that it was not created for the financial benefit of
the Tribe, nor was it established to aid in tribal self-governance.23
He argues that, contrarily, the College was created to benefit a
greater geographic location, the Flathead Indian Reservation, which
is home to a significant amount of people who are non-native or not
enrolled members of the Tribe.24 He supports these notions with the
18

See generally Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 8-28.
Id. at 9 (citing National Labor Relations Bd. v. Chapa De Indian Health
Program, 316 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003); People v. Miami Nation Enters.,
386 P.3d 357, 372 (Cal. 2016)).
20
Id. at 10.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 11.
23
Id. at 14.
24
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 15.
19
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fact that less than 30% of the College’s employees are tribal
members, and, at most, 28% of the enrolled student body is affiliated
with the Tribe.25
Finally, McCoy also contends that the Tribe’s lack of control
based on the structure, ownership, and management of the College
shows that it is not an arm of the Tribe. McCoy again draws the
distinction between the Montana corporation and the Tribal
corporation, noting that the College, as a completely distinct legal
entity from the tribally incorporated entity, grants no control to the
Tribe through either the formal governance structure or through
control of day-to-day activities.26 He argues not only that there is a
lack of control by the Tribe, but also that the College’s Articles of
Incorporation show no intent to share tribal sovereignty. He claims
this omission puts the College beyond tribal control and establishes
the College as a separate entity, not acting as an arm of the Tribe.27
Consequently, it does not enjoy sovereign immunity.
B.

Appellee and Intervenor-Appellee’s Arguments

Both the Tribe and the College (collectively “Appellees”)
advance the same arguments, essentially, that the College meets all
aspects of the White test. The Appellees counter McCoy’s main
argument that the College is a Montana entity separate from the
tribally incorporated entity with the Ninth Circuit’s holdings in other
suits that have been lodged against the College.28 The Appellee’s
contend that these cases completely refute the separate entity theory
presented by McCoy. They note that the Montana Supreme Court
has recognized that a single tribal entity can be dually incorporated
under state and tribal law,29 and that, contrary to McCoy’s assertion,
25

Id. at 15 (citing the College’s Annual Report, ER Vol. 2, 136–51).
Id. at 18–19.
27
Id. at 21.
28
Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 2, at 7–8 (citing Smith v. Salish
Kootenai College, 434 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc); Smith v. Salish
Kootenai Coll., CV-02-00055-M-LBE, 2003 WL 24831272, (D. Mont. Mar. 7,
2003); Cain v. Salish Kootenai Coll., Inc., CV-12-181-M-BMM, 2018 WL
2272792, (D. Mont. May 17, 2018)).
29
Id. at 8 (citing Flat Ctr. Farms, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue, 49 P.3d 578 (Mont.
2002)).
26
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dual incorporation of a tribal entity does not cause the entity to lose
its tribal status.30 Appellees insist that the court should not follow
McCoy’s narrow view of incorporation, but rather, they must view
the College as one entity based on the state and tribal Articles of
Incorporation, Bylaws, Policies, and the College’s tribal charter.31
The Appellees further argue that the College is an important arm
of the Tribe and finding otherwise would devastate the College
while potentially depriving the Tribe and the people of the Flathead
Reservation from their sole source of post-secondary education.32
The Appellees argue that the potential ramifications of finding the
College to be a non-Indian entity include a flood of litigation which
would be financially ruinous to the College, and the loss of key
federal funding.33
The Appellees also focus on the control issue under the
White test. The College establishes its qualification as a “tribally
controlled college” under the Tribally Controlled Colleges and
Universities Act, which requires that a tribally controlled college
must be chartered by the governing body of an Indian tribe.34 The
Appellees argue that McCoy’s interpretation of White would require
pervasive Tribal Council control and management of the College.
This requirement would adversely affect the recognized tribal
interest that a tribe may govern through entities other than formal
tribal leadership.35 The College emphasizes the critical financial
relationship the Tribe plays in obtaining funding;36 the Tribe’s intent

30

Id. (citing Koke v. Little Shell Tribe of Chippewa Indians of Mont., Inc., 68
P.3d 814 (Mont. 2003).
31
Id. at 9.
32
See generally Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 2; Intervenor-Appellee
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes’ Answering Brief (9th Cir. Mar. 11,
2019) (No. 18-35729).
33
Intervenor-Appellee Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes’ Answering
Brief at 12 (specifically referring to the College’s funding under the Tribal
College Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq.).
34
Id. at 13.
35
Intervenor-Appellee Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes’ Answering
Brief, supra note 32, at 13–14 (citing Smith, 434 F.3d at 1133).
36
Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 2, at 40–41.
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for the College to share its sovereign immunity;37 and the inability
of the College to waive its sovereign immunity; among other
arguments adverse to McCoy’s narrow interpretation of the White
factors.38
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Incorporation Under State Law and its Effect on Tribal
Sovereignty

McCoy puts significant weight on the fact that the College
is incorporated under the laws of Montana, but the College argues
that incorporation under state law is possible while retaining its
tribal status. The district court disagreed with McCoy’s
interpretation on this matter, citing Smith.39 Smith dealt with a
similar position advanced by McCoy here and against the same
entity.40 However, the holding in Smith does not provide an adequate
answer to the question of tribal sovereignty, it merely drew upon
several cases discussing sovereign immunity.41 The distinction
made in Cain42 directed the court to address the “arm of the tribe”
analysis under the White factors, and a subsequent non-precedential
decision in that case by the district court dismissed the action in
accordance with the White factors, notably ruling that the method of
incorporation supported the College’s sovereign immunity claim.43
The Court must determine whether the method of creation
does, in fact, follow the district court’s interpretation in Cain, or if
37

Id. at 35.
Id. at 35–36 (citing United States ex rel. Cain v. Salish Kootenai Coll. Inc.,
862 F.3d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that waiver of sovereign immunity is
irrelevant when a statute does not apply to the Tribes in the first place)).
39
Order at 6, McCoy v. Salish Kootenai Coll., Inc., (D. Mont. August 10, 2018)
(CV-17-88-M-DLC); 434 F.3d at 1134.
40
434 F.3d at 1134–35 (affirming the Tribal Court of Appeals and the district
court’s findings that the College is a tribal entity or an arm of the tribe).
41
United States ex rel. Cain, 862 F.3d at 943–944 (quoting Kiowa Tribe of
Okla. v. Mfg Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760) (discussing the difference in
application of sovereign immunity to suits in the sovereign’s own courts versus
suits in the courts of another sovereign).
42
Id.
43
Memorandum and Order at 3–4, Cain v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc., (D.
Mont. May 17, 2018) (CV 12-181-M-BMM).
38
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it instead will adopt McCoy’s separate entity interpretation.
Precedent dictates the likely answer will be a finding for the College.
The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that state incorporation of a
tribally incorporated entity will not divest the tribal corporation of
its tribal status as McCoy suggests.44 Dual incorporation does not
divest a tribal corporation of its tribal status, and, moreover, the
Tribe’s Tribal Council originally chartered and established the
College under the authority of the Indian Reorganization Act45 and
the Tribe’s Constitution.46 The Court will likely not follow a narrow
interpretation of the White factors, but rather view the College as a
dually incorporated entity, satisfying the first White factor.
B.

Control and Other Crucial Factors

The Tribe expressed significant concern about the
implications of requiring the Tribal Council to integrate themselves
into the College’s governance as well as controlling day-to-day
activities.47 Instead, the amount of control required is not such a
rigid and definite structure.48 The Court will consider all relevant
factors of control, and even if the College had completely
outsourced its management to a nontribal third party, that alone is
not enough to shift the weight against sovereign immunity.49
However, if the Tribe neglects their governance role or fails to
exercise any control or oversight, acting merely as passive owners,
then the control factor would subsequently weigh against
immunity.50 That is not the case here though, where the Tribe plays
an active role in the governance of the College while maintaining
the balance of autonomy required to keep its accreditation.51

44

Smith, 434 F.3d at 1129; Allen, 464 F.3d at 1044.
25 U.S.C. § 476.
46
Order, supra note 38, at 6.
47
Intervenor-Appellee Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes’ Answering
Brief, supra note 32, at 13–15.
48
See Memphis Biofuels, LLC v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., Inc., 585 F.3d 917,
922 (6th Cir. 2009).
49
Miami, 386 P.3d at 373.
50
Id.
51
Order, supra note 38, at 9.
45
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The Tribe adamantly protests that the College is much more
than an unrelated, arm’s length entity located on the Flathead
Reservation.52 Under the White test, the purpose of the College is
scrutinized to determine whether it was created for the benefit of the
Tribe or for some other purpose. The purpose is viewed in light of
whether the incorporators were acting in the best interest of the Tribe
when they created the entity.53 The Appellees’ argument that the
College is an integral part of protecting the Tribe’s culture and
history, while also providing invaluable educational resources to
member and non-member Indians, will also likely weigh in favor of
the College being a closely related arm of the Tribe and thus
protected from suit by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
V.

CONCLUSION

The delicate balance that exists in federal Indian law cannot
be subject to narrow, non-inclusive interpretations of precedent
established to protect the sovereignty of Indian tribes over their
members, entities, and territories. In the decades preceding this case,
the College has had its sovereign status challenged on more than one
occasion. The courts have thus far refused to lift the protective veil
of sovereign immunity from the College and allow it to be sued
outside of tribal courts. So, while McCoy’s claims deserve equal
treatment under the law, they must be brought in a court with proper
jurisdiction.

52

Intervenor-Appellee Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes’ Answering
Brief, supra note 32, at 6.
53
Breakthrough, 629 F.3d at 1192.

